The impossibility of finitism: from SSK to ESK? by Tyfield, David
Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics, 
Volume 1, Issue 1, 
Autumn 2008, pp. 61-86. 
http://ejpe.org/pdf/1-1-art-3.pdf 
 
AUTHOR’S NOTE: I would like to thank Francesco Guala, Uskali Mäki, the participants of 
the LSE Conference on Philosophy of Social Sciences 2005, and two anonymous 
referees, for comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Any errors that remain are, of 
course, mine. 
 
The impossibility of finitism:  
from SSK to ESK? 
 
 
DAVID TYFIELD  




Abstract: The dramatic and ongoing changes in the funding of science 
have stimulated interest in an economics of scientific knowledge (ESK), 
which would investigate the effects of these changes on the scientific 
enterprise. Hands (1994) has previously explored the lessons for such 
an ESK from the existing precedent of the sociology of scientific 
knowledge (SSK). In particular, he examines the philosophical problems 
of SSK and those that any ESK in its image would face. This paper 
explores this argument further by contending that more recent 
literature in SSK exposes even deeper philosophical problems than those 
identified by Hands. Meaning finitism has emerged as the philosophical 
core of SSK. An examination of the profound problems with this 
position is used to show that an underlying extensionalism is the root of 
SSK’s intractable philosophical difficulties, and to illustrate the entirely 
different approach of a critical philosophy that is advocated in its place. 
In this way, the project of an ESK is shown to depend upon a critical 
philosophy. 
 
Keywords: economics of science, sociology of scientific knowledge 
(SSK), meaning finitism, extensionalism, critical philosophy 
 




The dramatic changes currently occurring in the funding and economic 
imperatives of scientific research have naturally led to an upsurge in 
interest in an economics of science (e.g., Mirowski and Sent 2008; 
Mirowski and Sent 2002). Indeed, allied to a number of disciplinary 
developments in the philosophy of science and economics, recent years 
have seen the emergence of a plethora of research projects all calling 
themselves the ‘economics of science’ but with little in common beyond 
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the name (Sent 1999). Few if any of such projects offer explanations of 
why these changes have occurred. Nor do they offer theoretical 
frameworks for rigorous examination of the effects of these changes on 
the production of scientific knowledge, what may be called an 
‘economics of scientific knowledge’ (ESK). Such a research programme, 
however, seems to be of exceptional practical importance in an age 
characterized by the social penetration of, and dependence upon, 
scientific knowledge. Indeed, there have been widespread expressions of 
concern regarding the potentially corrosive effects of the deepening 
presence of economic incentives in scientific research.1 There is thus a 
significant gap calling for this ESK to be established.  
As Hands (1994) notes, the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) 
seems to be an obvious place to start for such an ESK. Yet he points out 
that any SSK-based ESK would need to face up to the particular 
philosophical problems that beset SSK; in 1994, this was revolving 
primarily around the so-called “problem of reflexivity”. However, much 
of recent debate regarding SSK (and particularly the strong programme 
of the Edinburgh School) has been concerned with the related issues of 
meaning “finitism”, “interactionist” social ontology, and Kripke’s 
Wittgenstein, marking a definite shift in the philosophical debate from 
earlier concerns about reflexivity.2 Indeed, finitism must now be 
acknowledged as a (or perhaps even the) central element of the model of 
science & technology studies (STS) associated with the Edinburgh School. 
Far from this shift in the debate leading to stronger philosophical 
grounds, it seems that SSK’s philosophical problems are as deep as ever. 
It is argued here that the philosophical problems of SSK are much more 
profound than the familiar problems of “reflexivity”. In particular, 
finitism is intelligible only if it is false. It follows that SSK is not merely 
self-refuting, but, insofar as it holds onto finitism, it is unintelligible. If 
SSK is even to be able to sustain its own research programme, let alone 
act as role model for an ESK, it must therefore forsake finitism. 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Boyle 1996, Boyle 2003; Brown 2000; Campbell, et al. 2002; Eisenberg 1987; 
Eisenberg 1996; Geiger 2004; Heller and Eisenberg 1998; Krimsky 2003; Nelson 2001; 
Nelson 2004; Newfield 2003; Resnik 2007; Washburn 2005; and references in Mirowski 
and Sent 2002. For more sanguine assessments of the changes see, e.g., Callon 2002; 
Greenberg 2001; Shapin 2003; Tijssen 2004. 
2 See, e.g., the debates between Kusch (2004), Bloor (2004), and Sharrock (2004); and 
between Stueber (2005, 2006), King (2006), and Bernasconi-Kohn (2006). For the 
purpose of brevity, unless otherwise stated I will be using ‘SSK’ to refer exclusively to 
the Edinburgh School in this paper. 
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Analysis of this problem reveals the root of these philosophical woes 
to be SSK’s implicit philosophical commitment to an “extensionalist” 
theory of meaning, in which (the development of) the meaning of a term 
is understood in terms of (the growth of) the set of objects incorporated 
under that label. Repudiation of this extensionalism demands taking a 
completely different approach to the philosophical examination of the 
nature (or ontology) of meaning. This novel approach is effectively 
“transcendental” or “critical” in nature, involving examination of the 
necessary conditions of possibility of the premise; in this case, the 
familiar but problematic possibility of intelligible application of 
meanings and rules. In short, in order to resolve SSK’s philosophical 
problems so that it can fulfil its potential as an insightful examination 
of the social nature of scientific knowledge production and act as model 
for an ESK, the entire approach to the philosophical issues that plague 
SSK must be rethought. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, I introduce SSK in 
more depth and explore the centrality of meaning finitism in its 
philosophical vision. In the following sections, I proceed to explore the 
philosophical problems with SSK, first reviewing the familiar problems 
already discussed in the ESK literature, and then turning to the deeper 
problems regarding meaning finitism and its underlying extensionalism. 
The latter argument is then developed in a discussion of the resolution 
of these problems offered by the alternative approach of a critical and 
transcendental philosophy, before concluding in the final section. 
 
WHAT IS SSK? THE CENTRALITY OF FINITISM 
In order to appraise SSK, we must first work out what it is. In brief, SSK 
is the empirical examination of the generation of scientific knowledge as 
an open-ended and contingent social process, situated in specific socio-
historical locations.3 As is often (always?) the case, one may perhaps 
understand its project more clearly by considering what it is against; in 
this case, that is: Parsonian functionalist sociology of norms; Mertonian 
sociology of science; and, underlying both of these, what Barnes and 
Bloor dub ‘rationalist’ ex ante philosophy of science.4 
                                                 
3 The literature on SSK is now very large. For overviews, see Barnes and Edge 1982; 
Barnes, Bloor, and Henry 1996; Barnes 1974; Bloor 1991; Collins 1983; Shapin 1995, 
and references therein. On the ‘social turn’ in the philosophy of science more generally 
following Kuhn 1970; see Hands 2001, chapter 5. 
4 For a discussion of Parsons, see Barnes 1995. For the sociology of science, see Merton 
1973. Barnes and Bloor use the term ‘rationalist’ philosophy of science, for example, in 
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As such SSK is both a sociological enquiry into the actual generation 
of beliefs in the social world of ‘science’, and a naturalistic (if not anti-
philosophical) philosophy of science upon which the former is based.5 
The key move in the development of SSK is the shift from the 
investigation of science for the truth (or rationality) of scientific 
knowledge to the question of why belief A rather than B (or C, or...) is 
accorded credibility by the scientific community.6 The history of science 
reveals that the development of scientific knowledge is ridden with 
controversy. The ‘facts’ can be, and are, interpreted in many different 
ways. It follows that the ‘facts’ themselves cannot determine scientific 
knowledge. SSK instead turns its attention to the causal explanation of 
how different beliefs come to be believed. Given that all beliefs must 
come to be believed, this leads to the “symmetry principle”, which 
demands that both ‘true’ and ‘false’ scientific beliefs must be treated 
equally as regards how people came to accept them (Barnes and Bloor 
1982, 23). 
How is this position reached? Starting from the Kuhnian insights 
into the social relativity of beliefs and the theory-ladenness of 
observation, and the broader changes in post-positivist (e.g., Quinean) 
philosophy towards a non-foundational epistemology, SSK argues that 
whether our beliefs are true or false is entirely inaccessible to us, for we 
cannot step outside ourselves and our social world in order to compare 
our beliefs with the world as it is.7 It follows that there is no ultimate 
appraisal of scientific knowledge, only the situating of it in further 
scientific understanding of how ‘scientific’ knowledge is produced and 
the status of that ‘knowledge’. 
                                                                                                                                               
Barnes and Bloor 1982. The phrase seems to include not only classical logical 
positivism of the “Received View” (Suppe 1977; Hands 2001) but also post-positivist 
developments that seek to uncover the rationality of the development of science. Thus 
Lakatos 1970; Laudan 1977; and Worrall 1990, are all explicitly cited as examples on 
various occasions. For an extended debate between the positions see Laudan 1981, 
1982; and Bloor 1981. 
5 Classic examples of the former include Collins and Pinch 1993; and Shapin and 
Schaffer 1985. Note also that ‘inductivist’ in this context means simply that the logic of 
this process is ampliative and not only logically determined, as per deductive schemas 
of reasoning. 
6 There is a possible ambiguity in the term ‘credibility’, noted by Haddock (2004, 3, 5). 
As I use the term, it refers to the actual social acceptance given to a belief and not the 
belief’s plausibility. 
7 Barnes and Bloor explicitly refer to Quine (1960, 1980) much less often than to 
Wittgenstein. Nevertheless he is acknowledged as a major source of their work. See, 
e.g., Bloor 1998, 632; Barnes 1982; and Barnes 1983. 
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Another way in to the argument proceeds from (a reading of) 
Wittgenstein’s Philosophical investigations (2001).8 This starts from a 
position in which social life and interaction, including the development 
of (scientific) knowledge, is a matter of extending meanings, rules, and 
classes to new instances; a theoretical position called “extensionalism”. 
Pickering (1992, 4) summarizes the resulting argument well: 
 
Since the central problematic of SSK is that of knowledge, the first 
move is to characterize the technical culture of science as a single 
conceptual network, along the lines suggested by the philosopher of 
science Mary Hesse (1980).9 Concepts […] within the net are said to 
be linked to one another by generalizations of varying degrees of 
certainty, and to the natural world by the piling up of instances 
under the headings of various observable terms. When scientific 
culture is specified in this way, an image of scientific practice 
follows: practice is the creative extension of the conceptual net to fit 
new circumstances.10 
 
This process of extending the net to new instances, however, is not 
logically determined by the meaning (or rule, or class) itself. In the 
famous example deployed by Wittgenstein (2001, §185), for instance, a 
child is asked to “add” 1 to a particular number, in order to test their 
understanding of arithmetic. Instead of counting “1, 2, 3, 4…”, however, 
the child continues “1, 11, 111, 1111…” One may rebuke the child for 
not understanding, but in fact “plus”, or any other term, cannot be 
exhaustively and unambiguously defined so as to make its application 
always certain and uniquely logically determined. Hence the chastened 
child may now simply proceed “1, 2, 3, 4, 11, 12, 13…” instead and may 
continue to offer unexpected variations that fit the further specified and 
refined requirements of the rule ad infinitum. 
                                                 
8 The validity of this reading is the subject of much of the recent debate. See, for 
example, the exchange between Bloor (1992) and Lynch (1992a, 1992b), as well as more 
recent work by Kusch (2004, 2006), with replies from Bloor (2004) and Sharrock (2004). 
Perhaps it would be more accurate to use the common neologism of ‘Kripkenstein’ 
rather than Wittgenstein when referring to SSK’s philosophical influences, following 
Kripke’s (1982) exposition of Wittgenstein, though even this differs in important 
respects from SSK’s argument. More on this below, but also see Bloor 1997. 
9 For ‘Hesse nets’ see also Hesse 1976. 
10 Note that the two communities party to this debate, philosophers and sociologists, 
tend to use the term ‘extension’ in two slightly different ways. For philosophers, the 
‘extension’ is the extent of the particulars covered by that class. For sociologists (e.g., 
Pickering 1992, 4) ‘extension’ refers to the act of extending this class to the next 
instance. I will be using the term in the philosophical sense. 
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In short, logical determination of the application of rules cannot 
reside in the rules themselves, but can only be determined for all 
instances where they are themselves already specified. As such, an 
infinitely specified definition is impossible, the resulting theory of 
meaning is “finitism”, so-called because at any one time the existing 
extension of a meaning is finite, and it is precisely because of this that 
extending it to the next instance is not already determined. According to 
Barnes, et al. (1996), finitism may therefore be defined by five criteria, 
namely: 
 
1) Future applications of terms are open-ended; 
2) No act of classification is ever indefeasibly correct; 
3) All acts of classification are revisable; 
4) Successive applications of a kind term are not independent; and 
5) The applications of different kind terms are not independent of 
each other. 
 
In short, this presents an inductivist account such that: 
 
a class is its accepted instances at a given point of time: those 
instances are the existing resources for deciding what else belongs 
in the class, the available precedents for further acts of 
classification, the basis for further case-to-case development of 
classification (Barnes, et al. 1996, 105).11 
 
This argument is generally used to argue that, in the absence of 
determination of future applications by existing meanings, there is no 
(private, mentalistic) fact of the matter regarding what is meant by a 
proposition; what may be called “meaning scepticism”. 
In the case of SSK, however, the particular application of this 
argument regards the process of science, with such a model taken to 
represent the development of all scientific knowledge. This leads to the 
conclusion that ‘philosophy’, which attempts to explain how the 
development of science is a rational process determined by the internal 
logic of scientific knowledge, is entirely wrong-headed, attempting the 
impossible. Nor does SSK shy away from the radical implications of this 
thesis. Thus it is argued that logic itself cannot be deductively, i.e., 
logically, justified; for the meaning of the logical operations themselves 
                                                 
11 See also Barnes and Bloor 1982, 39. 
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are classifications whose extension is also open-ended.12 It follows that, 
pace ‘rationalist’ philosophy of science, neither logic nor the empirical 
evidence determines the development of science. 
If this is the case, it follows that something else must determine 
what scientists believe and how these beliefs change. SSK’s solution is 
that social interests are the relevant determining factor and thus social 
science can explain the development of science more generally (Barnes 
1982, 35; Barnes, et al. 1996, 29). A strict dichotomy is thus set up 
between investigating the process of science philosophically (wrong, 
according to SSK) and sociologically (right). As Mäki (1992) claims, this 
is a radically pro-science, even scientistic programme, in which science 
is to be explained by more science, and there is never deemed to be any 
need for philosophical justification.13 
In order to be able to examine the empirical and contingent process 
of knowledge production as a social process, SSK also needs a social 
ontology that can make sense of the contact between social factors and 
the production of science, thus conceived. This takes us to the second 
element of SSK’s argument—set against Parsonian functionalism—
namely the social ontology of “interactionism”, so named because social 
‘reality’ is argued to be the outcome of the concrete interactions of 
actual (sociable and mutually-susceptible) individuals. 
Interactionism is effectively a social ontology of finitist social rules. 
It acknowledges the experience of apparently irreducible social facts, 
particularly as social rules and norms, and so rejects methodological 
individualism. But these social rules are not accorded ontological status 
as ‘real’, and so reified as in Parsonian functionalism, because the 
apparent intransigence of society is simply the result of taking too 
narrow a perspective (King 1999a, 1999b, 2006). 
Clearly, social rules are meaningful or else they could not be 
followed (nor transgressed) by human agents. However, given the 
picture of meaning discussed above, the application of a social rule in 
any given instance is precisely to extend a rule so as to include a new 
particular. Finitism shows, though, that the pre-existing meaning of the 
social rule cannot logically determine this process. It follows that social 
                                                 
12 See Barnes, et al. 1996, 198, et seq., for consideration of the paradox of the heap as 
the reductio ad absurdum of modus ponens; also see Barnes and Bloor 1982, 42. 
13 Barnes (1982, 38) calls SSK a “totally naturalistic approach to semantic problems”. 
Hands (1997, 2001) also argues that SSK is simply a philosophical naturalism, like 
those deferring to biology or cognitive science. 
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rules cannot determine—nor therefore explain—any apparent ‘following’ 
of the rule nor any other associated social process. 
For interactionism, therefore, social rules are merely the finitist 
precedent produced by past concrete interactions of individuals. The 
resulting social ontology is ‘interactionist’ in that it consists of the 
output of the negotiations and consensus of all the interactions of 
humanity throughout history regarding the extension, and hence 
meaning, of ‘social rules’, i.e., a conception of ‘Social life as 
bootstrapped induction’ (Barnes 1983). From the perspective of any one 
individual, therefore, social reality will seem given and real, but in fact 
this is simply because the social ‘reality’ confronting us is the result of 
the interactions of all the rest of humanity, which are obviously always 
greatly beyond our individual control. 
Taking these two strands of analysis of science and social ontology 
together, then, what is the effect of this argument as regards SSK’s 
empirical and sociological program for studying the interaction of 
science and society? If we acknowledge that both, social rules and 
scientific theoretical propositions, are meanings (part of the conceptual 
‘Hesse net’) and that these are only extended ‘inductively’, it follows 
immediately that the very content of scientific knowledge will also be 
responsive (however indirectly) to the social positioning, and hence to 
the particular understanding associated with given social interests, of 
the scientists.  
Furthermore, given that there is only ever comparison of beliefs 
within the net of meaning and so no discrimination of ‘true’ and ‘false’ 
beliefs by comparing them directly with the world, social factors can be 
seen to feature in explanations of all scientific knowledge and not just 
lapses or corruptions of the ‘pure’ logic of scientific discovery through 
reference to perversion of the specifically scientific social norms. It 
follows that, as regards the third and final limb of SSK, Mertonian 
sociology of science is seen to be wrong in the ‘rationalist’ assumption 
of a scientific method and its consequent exclusive focus on the social 
conditions necessary for the emergence of the particular social norms 
that characterize the institution of this disinterested scientific enquiry.14 
For SSK, such sociology of science does not go far enough in its 
employment of sociological analysis in science, i.e., right into the heart 
                                                 
14 That is, the (in-?)famous four norms of ‘Disinterestedness’, ‘Communism’, 
‘Scepticism’, and ‘Universalism’: see Merton 1973; and the discussion in Hands 2001, 
180, et seq. 
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of scientific knowledge and not just concerning the institutional norms 
of ‘science’. 
In summary, in the context of massive changes to the economics of 
science, examination of the impact of economic conditions on the 
production of scientific knowledge—an economics of scientific 
knowledge (ESK)—would seem to be extremely important. SSK seems to 
afford the examination of the interaction of social beliefs and (the 
development of) scientific knowledge itself in just the way we are 
seeking for such an ESK. However, were we to consider an SSK-based 
ESK, we must immediately acknowledge the significant problems with 
SSK, to which we now turn. 
 
PROBLEMS WITH SSK 1: THE FAMILIAR PROBLEM OF REFLEXIVITY 
Probably the most high profile of SSK’s theoretical problems is its 
perennial problem of reflexivity, as it has been discussed in earlier 
examinations of the suitability of SSK for ESK (Hands 1994). Indeed, “all 
of the authors involved in the recent SSK feel impelled to give some 
response to the question of reflexivity and the relativism (that many 
suggest) it implies” (Hands 1994, 93, original emphasis). Furthermore, 
“what tends to happen [in SSK studies] is that the sociological theories 
and (anti) philosophical arguments upstage” its empirical work (Hess 
1997). But SSK’s anti-philosophical naturalism is so domineering 
precisely because of the intractable philosophical and theoretical 
problems it throws up. If we are to resolve these problems and fulfil 
SSK’s promise as an examination into the interaction of social factors 
and the production of knowledge, then we must pay some explicit 
attention to these philosophical problems and their origins. 
What, though, is the problem of reflexivity? As Hands summarizes it: 
 
Many of the advocates of the SSK claim to undermine the hegemony 
of the natural sciences by showing that what is purported to be 
objective and ‘natural’ is neither one of these things, but rather 
simply a product of the social context in which it is produced. If this 
is true for all human inquiry, then it must be said for the SSK as 
well; this makes everything socially/context dependent and thus 
relative. (Hands 1994, 92, original emphasis). 
 
It follows that there would be no grounds, other than social 
happenstance, for accepting any belief, and this includes SSK itself. 
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Hence the “problem of reflexivity” is that if the SSK argument is correct, 
we have no grounds to accept SSK itself. 
I agree with this point (though it is made rather too quickly here, as 
we shall see), but I do not draw the same conclusions as Hands. For 
Hands (1994, 96) concludes that the problems of reflexivity of SSK are 
“not so great as to deter entry” into an economics of science in SSK’s 
footsteps. Rather, he sees the experience of SSK as informative, offering 
cautionary tales about the ‘wilderness’ through which it has walked and 
for which economics of science must also steel itself (Hands 1994, 97). 
But on what grounds can Hands counsel that reflexivity does not 
present such a problem for SSK so as to rule out economics of science 
ab initio? For when Hands writes that: “Those involved in the SSK have 
travelled through much of this wilderness [of reflexivity problems and 
philosophical disorientation] before us, and to neglect their signposts 
would surely be a folly” (Hands 1994, 96), this can only be read so as to 
license a recommendation to follow them on the condition that SSK has 
actually travelled ‘through’ the wilderness and not merely ‘into’ it, i.e., it 
must have come out the other side. SSK’s route must take us somewhere 
worth travelling to. 
It is by no means clear to me that SSK is not, philosophically, still 
wondering adrift. Indeed, to be fair to Hands, his more recent writings 
on SSK and economics of science (Hands 1997, 2001) do not make such 
a bold claim as regards the ‘role-model’ SSK can provide, perhaps 
precisely because the intervening period has seen merely an 
exacerbation of this problem as parts of science & technology studies 
take ever-more outlandish stances in an attempt to deal with it. Indeed, 
the relative philosophical conservatism of SSK is a major reason that I 
have chosen it in particular as the STS tradition addressed in this paper, 
with the philosophical critique being offered applying a fortiori to other, 
more radically anti-philosophical STS perspectives. 
But it follows that if SSK is still stranded, then surely the best 
signpost to follow would not be those SSK has posted that lead 
nowhere, but the one that says ‘Danger, Wilderness Ahead, Do Not 
Enter’. The only other alternative is that SSK is, like democracy 
according to Churchill, the worst option apart from all the others. 
Nonetheless, for this to be the case, two points must be established: (1) 
just how bad it is, for it may be that anything would be better, even the 
status quo; and (2) what the alternatives are, if there are any. In 
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answering these questions, we will also see how the problem of 
reflexivity arises from the deeper problem of SSK’s finitism. 
Let us consider each of these points in turn. First, it may be retorted 
that this argument assumes that the wilderness is a particularly 
inhospitable place—that reflexivity presents a particularly devastating 
problem for SSK—and this is not the case. Certainly, this line of 
argument is perfectly defensible given one reading of the reflexivity 
problem. This states that the relevant criterion for assessment of 
scientific knowledge is its credibility, and that this is the case no matter 
whether the belief is in fact, coincidentally, ‘true’ or ‘false’. SSK itself, 
therefore, must also be susceptible to this kind of reflexive 
investigation, which would show how social factors have influenced its 
acceptance by some groups and rejection by others. But this requires 
only that the credibility conferred to all beliefs, whether ‘true’ or ‘false’, 
demand social explanation, and this is not the same as claiming that 
there is no difference between ‘true’ and ‘false’ beliefs, which would lead 
to reflexivity being a problem. 
Thus stated, it is quite right that the credibility of SSK is a social 
phenomenon and that this does not entail that accepting beliefs is 
merely a matter of whim. In this case, the reflexivity is a satisfying, not a 
negating, one. But then, we have been worrying about nothing! 
Reflexivity is not a problem at all. There is no wilderness ahead but 
civilization, science!  
Unfortunately, this is clearly not the case, as a more in-depth 
consideration of SSK shows. To criticise SSK in this way demands 
particular caution if we are to give it a fair hearing. We have seen SSK’s 
argument is in fact a radical repudiation of mainstream philosophy of 
science. It is thus no surprise that it has both generated much 
controversy, and that misinterpretations abound. For instance, it must 
be appreciated that SSK does not claim, pace some vociferous critics, 
that there are no such things as true or false beliefs; or that there is no 
way the world is, independent of our knowledge of it. It is only claiming 
that we cannot know (in the traditional sense of having justified belief) 
whether our beliefs are true or false, and so this cannot feature in any 
explanation of why a belief is held, hence the symmetry principle. We 
can have true or false beliefs but this is merely a matter of coincidental 
correspondence, and this correspondence, or lack thereof, is not 
accessible to us in any particular case and so cannot count as one of the 
causes of actual acceptance of that belief. 
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Nevertheless, even if we are careful about avoiding a straw man, 
SSK’s stance is highly problematic. For instance, consider the argument 
that there can be no conclusive appraisal of scientific truth, only the 
shifting allocation of credibility amongst different scientific belief, all 
within the finitist net of meaning and never by direct comparison of 
meaning and world. We cannot know whether our scientific beliefs are 
true or false and so we cannot refer to ‘truth’ or ‘falsity’ of beliefs: the 
terms become idle and superfluous. Yet if we cannot take account of 
truth or falsity, we have no grounds on which to discriminate ‘X’ from 
‘not X’, so that we can believe both. As such, the ‘truth’ and ‘falsity’ of 
our beliefs is a necessary condition of the possibility of rational 
judgement, and without judgement we fall prey to an all-consuming 
relativism that makes all beliefs equally ‘defensible’. 
In other words, if we cannot refer to ‘truth’ or ‘falsity’ (as per 
symmetry), we must forsake altogether all use of these concepts, and 
this includes tacit presupposition as well as explicit usage. But this rules 
out rational judgement and so abandons us to relativism. In the case of 
SSK, this relativism is simply displaced into social terms so that the 
social context ‘decides’ what is and what is not ‘knowledge’, now 
redefined as merely “that system of beliefs that a community 
collectively accepts as knowledge” (Bloor 1991, 3). SSK is thus neither 
more nor less ‘sound’ than any competing argument. Nor, crucially, can 
it provide ‘reasons’ at all, thus belying the pleas of Barnes (1974, 156) 
that, while not presentable in any particular argument, SSK is to be 
accepted because “this whole volume is crammed with proffered 
reasons why its main tenets should be accepted; its justification lies 
within itself.” Such talk of ‘justification’ is simply ruled out for SSK. 
It is crucial to recognize that what is being argued here is not that 
SSK is avowedly relativist in this way.15 Indeed, I have stressed above 
how SSK’s view on truth is not to deny that beliefs do in fact have a 
truth-value, only that we cannot know it either way in any particular 
case. However, it is a necessary condition of the possibility of rational 
judgement that we can employ the concepts of truth and falsity in the 
way that the symmetry thesis prohibits. And symmetry follows 
ineluctably from finitism and the Hesse-net picture of meaning, because 
these entail that all beliefs are simply a matter of shifting the credibility 
accorded to definitions in “the creative [and undetermined] extension of 
                                                 
15 It is in this sense that Hands’s reconstruction of the reflexivity argument above could 
be said to be too quick. 
TYFIELD / THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF FINITISM: FROM SSK TO ESK? 
VOLUME 1, ISSUE 1, AUTUMN 2008 73 
the conceptual net” (Pickering 1992, 4). The present argument, 
therefore, is rather that, regardless of whether SSK is explicitly 
judgementally relativist or not, its allegiance to finitism and the 
symmetry thesis commits it to this relativism. Hence no amount of 
express protest about its rejection of this position can prove the 
contrary, just as the sceptic, conversely, cannot but display his lack of 
scepticism once outside the classroom by always leaving the building 
through the front door and never through the second floor window 
(Bhaskar 1998). 
Should evidence for this theory and practice inconsistency in SSK’s 
program be needed, it is available in abundance. For instance, given that 
use of the concept ‘truth’ is a necessary condition of the possibility of a 
rational discourse, and given further that SSK is participating in such a 
rational discourse while simultaneously proscribing use of the concept 
‘truth’, it follows immediately that there is an insoluble paradox at its 
very heart that can only play itself out in interminable fractiousness and 
disagreement. And this, of course, is exactly what has happened to the 
wider SSK programme, splintering into mutually incompatible sub-
programmes at loggerheads in a lethal but never-ending game of 
‘epistemological chicken’, in which protagonists are challenged to take 
ever greater risks in the explicit affirmation of such a self-refuting 
judgemental relativism (Collins and Yearley 1992a, 1992b; Woolgar 
1992; Callon and Latour 1992). In short, it seems that SSK throws itself 
out with its own bathwater.16 If this is the case, not only do these 
philosophical problems effectively prevent SSK from sustaining its 
critical challenge to Received-View philosophy and sociology of science, 
but also any economics of science that would follow SSK’s lead would be 
beset by exactly the same errors. 
But—it can be retorted—you cannot blame SSK for this! For as SSK 
shows, even logic itself cannot be justified in a non-circular way and all 
SSK is doing is pointing this out; we cannot blame the messenger. In 
other words, the logical circularity of deductive logic itself shows 
reflexive inconsistency to be inevitable. This is the typical defence 
employed by SSK. Barnes (1974, 39) argues, for instance, that such 
reflexive inconsistency is merely “the appalling, unresolved difficulties 
of philosophy” which “do not”, and by implication should not, “worry 
                                                 
16 Hands (1994, 95) uses the phrase, but I note that he is not referring directly to SSK 
when he does so. See also Rosenberg 1985 for statements to the same effect; and 
Callon and Latour 1992 for the original joke about the ‘Bath school’, though from a 
radically different perspective. 
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the layman”.17 The tactic thus is to claim innocence by way of universal 
guilt or to point out that, like it or not, the wilderness is the only option, 
because it is everywhere. The position is not hopeless, however, 
according to SSK, because its general inductivism leads to a 
bootstrapping philosophy, where ‘truth’ is accorded as a mark of post 
hoc success. 
While it is not clear that this offers sufficient defence, it does seem 
that if we concede SSK’s critical points—viz. that meaning is not unique 
and fully determining so that even logical terms do not logically 
determine—then there is at least a shift of the burden of proof onto 
those who would like to claim that reflexive inconsistency is a problem 
for theories because it is a criterion that discriminates (between 
consistent, and so tenable, beliefs and those that are not), rather than a 
ubiquitous and insuperable condition of all discourse. Indeed, in the 
absence of any demonstration to the contrary, SSK has been able to 
withstand such criticism despite the manifest inconsistency of its 
position for the last two decades. I believe that the critical arguments 
SSK makes against its various ‘rationalist’ opponents are sound, so it 
seems the challenge is to show that there is a way out of SSK’s 
problems. 
This takes us to the second problem of evaluating the alternatives to 
SSK’s wilderness. The rest of the paper seeks to argue not only that 
there is such an alternative, but also that we can find it by looking at 
SSK itself, though not at what it would point out to us explicitly. Indeed, 
in order to see the alternatives what is needed is not some miraculous 
philosophical deus ex machina but a closer examination of the 
philosophical problems that are central to SSK’s project, namely those 
associated with finitism: the theory of meaning that is pivotal in its 
conception of the interaction of science and society and that lies at the 
root of these intractable difficulties. What is needed is to conduct a 
transcendental philosophical examination of SSK’s philosophical 
problematic itself. As we shall see, however, SSK’s philosophical 
naturalism acts to preclude any such examination on its own part, and 
thus serves to prevent SSK from addressing, let alone resolving, its 
problems of reflexivity. 
                                                 
17 Nor, it seems, the social scientist. Similarly, Collins, and Yearley (1992a, 308) argue 
that we all, not just SSK, find ourselves in an epistemic state of “permanent 
insecurity”. See also Barnes and Bloor 1982, 41; and Bloor 1998, 629. The problem with 
such statements is not that they are wrong but, like all such sceptical positions, that 
they are hugely overstated. 
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PROBLEMS OF SSK 2: THE NOVEL PROBLEMS OF EXTENSIONALISM 
Let us, therefore, take a closer look at finitism. SSK sets itself against the 
thesis that the development of science is determined by the meanings of 
the propositions formulating the proto-scientific laws to be tested by 
empirical observation. Against this thesis, it argues that because 
scientific laws can be interpreted in numerous ways, they do not have 
unique meaning regarding their application or testing in any given case. 
Instead, SSK argues positively, the infinite number of extensions 
logically compatible with the existing set shows that the development of 
scientific knowledge is unconstrained by the meaning of the proto-
scientific laws, which merely act as ‘precedents’ facilitating any 
subsequent inductive determination of its extension. 
The argument against ‘rationalist’ philosophy of science is cogent, 
but the derivative positive conclusion of finitism simply does not follow. 
That there is not one unique determinate meaning to any given 
proposition or rule does not entail that it can mean anything, but that it 
has many meanings, and ‘many’ does not equal ‘any’.18 For SSK to be 
persuasive here, we must overlook this step, or be presupposing 
something that acts as a minor premise to validate the inference, by 
justifying the false dilemma of theories, rules, and the like, either having 
a unique meaning or meaning anything at all. 
Similarly, consider the argument regarding social ontology and rules. 
The argument for finitism establishes that norms and rules cannot be 
formulated with sufficient precision to obviate the possibility of their 
systematic ‘misunderstanding’, giving them a logically consistent but 
alternative interpretation to that which is commonly socially accepted. 
Given that Parsonian norms are supposed to be such clearly-formulated 
and sui generis rules, it is plain that these could not possibly determine 
our social interaction in the way Parsons claims. Once again: so far so 
                                                 
18 Compare to comments by Mermin (1998, 610) that: SSK’s stretching of the related 
point of the underdetermination of theory by evidence to its radical conclusions 
overlooks the fact that it is “a trivial logical point [that] almost entirely misses the 
actual character of scientific practice.” For “the problem confronting physicists […] is 
rarely an overabundance of plausible theories [but…] is to find even a single 
reasonable theoretical structure […]” (original emphasis). Bloor’s (1998) response to 
this is particularly revealing for its characteristic shifting of meaning that conceals 
disagreement as agreement: “The problem is not that lots of theories fit perfectly: it is 
that nothing ever works properly […] so why do we prefer this imperfection to that 
imperfection?” This entirely distorts Mermin’s point, however, for he has not said that 
“nothing” ever works but that it is difficult, if possible, to find something that does. See 
also Laudan 1998; and Hacking 1992, 55. 
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good. But once again, SSK presents a false dilemma of either rules 
determining social interaction or social interaction determining rules to 
derive the latter as its positive conclusion. 
Given that these positive claims are finitist conclusions, therefore, 
we can conclude that finitism is ungrounded, the arguments in its 
favour resting on false dilemmas. Furthermore, once we dispense with 
finitism, the problems of reflexivity and relativism do not arise, because 
in each case these hang on SSK’s positive claims, not its critical ones. 
Thus, for instance, it is the finitist argument regarding ‘rationalist’ 
philosophy of science, and the specifically finitist picture of meaning as 
extending ‘Hesse nets’ to new instances, that leads to ruinous relativism, 
as we have seen. But why does SSK consider finitism and the false 
dilemmas that justify it to be compelling? The answer to this question 
lies in SSK’s extensionalist theory of meaning, on which its entire 
problematic is built.19 
We can readily accept that extending rules/theories to the next 
instance is not logically determined by their existing extensions. But this 
only licenses finitism if the development of rules/theories is identified 
with this process of extending extensive sets, i.e., given extensionalism. 
Nevertheless, from this extensional theory of meaning and its 
development, it follows that the only conceivable form of determination 
is logical determination, which is binary: in a given case either there is 
logical determination or there is not, as when an argument is 
deductively valid or not. 
Thus it is clearly extensionalism that licenses the false dilemma of 
uniquely determining or wholly indeterminate meaning; of meaning 
either one thing or anything/nothing. For given that the determination 
of the development of meaning is logical determination, the existing 
meaning (i.e., extensive set) determines how it is developed either 
uniquely or not at all. With ‘meaning’, ‘development’, and 
‘determination’ thus defined (as ‘extension’, ‘extending’, and ‘logical 
                                                 
19 Ironically, Barnes (1982) explicitly contrasts finitism and extensionalism, and affirms 
that “an alternative to extensional semantics is essential” (Barnes 1982, 24). However, 
the question he then goes on to address is “what determines whether or not a concept 
properly applies to its next instance?” The terms of his analysis of meaning are thus 
explicitly extensionalist, for it is extensionalism alone that sets this as the relevant 
question regarding semantic issues. Barnes, et al. (1996, 105) also explicitly state that 
“a class is its accepted instances at a given point of time.” It follows that Barnes’s 
whole investigation is conducted within an extensionalist paradigm, even if his 
conclusions are not aligned with the main protagonists in the ‘extensionalist’ 
philosophical debate (e.g., Putnam as ‘realist’, and Searle as ‘description theorist’ in 
this case). 
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determination’ respectively), it follows also that meaning does not 
determine its own development at all, i.e., finitism. But notice that SSK 
has not concluded that there is no such thing as intrinsic meaning, for 
its non-existence is assumed in the extensionalism of the very 
formulation of the question it addresses. 
Therefore, it is SSK’s prior commitment to extensionalism, what 
underlies the false dilemmas that would justify their positive 
conclusions. Extensionalism, however, is a common philosophical 
position that, in SSK’s useful terms, is accorded much credibility by the 
social community called ‘philosophy’. The question is thus: why must it 
be discarded? 
 
TOWARDS AN ALTERNATIVE PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH 
The first point to note in response to this question is that 
extensionalism is responsible for the positive claims of SSK and, as we 
have seen, these are blighted with an inimical relativism that renders 
them insupportable and self-refuting.20 Conversely, were we to dispense 
with extensionalism, we can retain the valuable critical arguments of 
SSK without being forced by the false dilemma to take that next step; 
one that then leads to the extinction of their critical challenge. This 
surely provides at least prima facie evidence, as a negative argument, to 
challenge extensionalism. 
But positive arguments in favour of taking intensionality seriously 
are also easily marshalled. For, in each case, the intelligibility of SSK’s 
claims rests on an unchallenged ambiguity that allows the tacit 
presupposition of what it is expressly denying to go unnoticed. In other 
words, it is not merely the case that SSK refutes itself but also that its 
positive claims, if true, would be unintelligible. It follows that if we 
understand the claims, they must be wrong. 
Consider the Wittgensteinian (2001, §185) example of the ‘+1’ rule, 
discussed above. SSK argues that extending the rule, and its extension at 
any given point in time, is not logically determined; no formulation of 
the rule can ever be sufficiently precise that it rules out all 
interpretations but one (the one intended). Thus ‘+1’, and every other 
rule, is actually indeterminate; anything goes (e.g., Barnes, et al. 1996). 
                                                 
20 There are legion other examples of direct inconsistency in SSK’s pronouncements, 
e.g., regarding finitism and consistency see Barnes 1982, 38, where finitism is argued 
to be the result of consistency; and the various Barnes and Bloor quotations noted 
above at footnote 17 regarding the impossibility of consistency given finitism. Laudan 
(1998, 321) also notes the blithe inconsistency of SSK. 
TYFIELD / THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF FINITISM: FROM SSK TO ESK? 
ERASMUS JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY AND ECONOMICS 78 
But if such a rule can mean anything at all—if it can mean ‘punch the 
teacher’ or ‘make porridge’ or anything else at all—then it is utterly 
without content and so is totally unintelligible. Alternatively, we can see 
that we can only understand the point being made by the ‘+1’ example 
because we do understand the rule in a determinate way and are struck 
by the possibility of understanding in a different way. But this is miles 
away from saying that the rule has no determinate meaning at all, in 
which case it would be totally unintelligible, as would any statement 
about it including SSK’s argument itself. 
Thus consider, for instance, trying to make SSK’s finitist point using 
the nonsense example ‘trung tring’ instead of ‘+1’. I say ‘trung tring’ to 
the difficult child and he proceeds to stand on his chair, or cry, or leave 
the room, or stare at me blankly, or else. Clearly, the finitist 
philosophical point cannot be demonstrated by this example because we 
do not already have some idea of what the rule means against which to 
compare the supposedly unusual interpretation of the child. Nor, 
therefore, can we say anything about this rule unless and until it does 
have some meaning for us. In other words, if ‘+1’ means anything at all, 
then SSK cannot intelligibly make any argument about it or making use 
of it. The only possible conclusion is that the extensionalist picture on 
which this argument is based is not what is happening in meaning use. 
As such, we can show that it is a necessary condition of the possibility 
of rule or meaning use that these are not, at any given time, totally 
unlimited in application. 
Exactly the same criticism may be made of SSK’s argument that the 
rules or theories underdetermine the development of scientific beliefs, 
which leads to the conclusion that social factors, such as interests, are 
the determining factor. But what are these social factors? According to 
the social ontology of SSK itself they can be no more than other social 
rules (e.g., the rule ‘make money’ or ‘find a partner’) ‘known’ by the 
individual, but these cannot, ex hypothesi, determine the social 
interaction that extends the other social rule. It follows that on SSK’s 
model, there is no determinate connection between social interaction 
and social rules, in which case it seems misleading to argue that there 
are any social rules in the first place. Conversely, their conclusion is 
only plausible if social rules are intelligible, in which case they do have 
intrinsic, determinate content, i.e., they are intensional and not just 
extensional. 
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A perfect illustration of this (which is also particularly relevant to 
issues of an ESK) is presented in Barnes et al. (1996) in discussion of a 
court case concerning a patent for aniline dyes.21 It is argued that what 
decides the outcome of the patent case is not the result of balancing of 
arguments, the “weighing” of “weightless quantities”, but is “a 
consequence of the balance of power”, i.e., as a matter of which decision 
will best serve the interests of the constitutional order and/or the legal 
establishment itself (it is not specified which). This sounds terribly 
scandalous, and of course it is welcome to remind us that a totally 
‘disinterested’ judiciary is just nonsense, but on SSK’s account, when 
there is nothing in the arguments made before the court that determines 
the outcome, we cannot even distort the decision by seeing how it would 
interact with ‘our’ or other power-political interests. Nor is there even 
any point in a judicial decision, because how the decision itself is then 
interpreted, whether in its implementation or in its future use as 
jurisprudential precedent, is entirely undetermined. Note that this also 
immediately makes a mockery of criteria 4 and 5 of finitism (mentioned 
above) that finitist meaning functions like a system of precedent, 
because finitism actually deprives such a system of any material that 
could ever act as such: precedents must constrain as well as enable; yet 
finitism systematically denies the former. 
Similarly, unable to see any implications of ‘knowing’ that we have 
particular ‘interests’—for there are none—then all decisions become 
impossible, as, ironically, Barnes et al. (1996, 124) themselves notice. In 
short, SSK cannot argue simultaneously that rules underdetermine and 
that the deficit is made up by other rules, yet its plausibility trades on 
this systematic ambiguity. SSK therefore argues that it can explain how 
scientists, judges, and the rest of us choose between belief A and belief 
B, but overlooks the fact that it cannot explain how we can choose at all, 
because, in its repudiation of philosophy and ontology, it denies the 
material cause of a relatively autonomous intensional meaning upon 
which all such agency depends. 
Similar arguments can be presented for all of SSK’s positive finitist 
claims because in each case close reading shows that SSK is arguing as 
follows: 
 
                                                 
21 Note also that, as presented, the argument suggests that the court is deciding on the 
actual chemistry and not merely on the patent dispute. It seems that Mermin (1998) 
also notices this. 
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(1) not A (critique of ‘rationalism’, compatible with extensionalism 
but also with intensionality) 
(2) either A or B (the disjunction of the false dilemma, from 
extensionalism) 
Therefore 
(3) B (unintelligible if true, intelligible only if false) 
 
Thus if we are to be able to understand SSK’s claims at all, we must 
admit from the outset that rules do have determinate content that 
constrains (as well as enables), but does not itself fully determine, our 
subsequent action, including development of the rule itself. This yields 
the distinction between determinate (i.e., a material cause that is 
constraining in the instant, but transformable in the future) and (fully, 
uniquely) determining meaning.22 But this is just to admit an intensional 
theory of meaning that acknowledges internal relations of necessity 
between different meanings, hence rendering meaning relatively 
resistant to our use of it so that we cannot simply do as we please—even 
collectively—with meaning, pace SSK. And this, in turn, is to refuse to 
identify meaning with extensive classes and extending them to new 
instances. 
We have, therefore, repudiated the extensionalist theory of meaning 
that is the root of SSK’s philosophical problems. In order to take this 
step, though, we have had to employ a transcendental, i.e., a specifically 
philosophical, argument, examining the necessary conditions of 
intelligibility of the philosophical problem itself. Such a sui generis 
philosophical analysis is exactly what SSK repudiates in its philosophical 
naturalism. However, this step is necessary for SSK if it is not to be 
forced to choose sides on the false dilemmas that arise from its 
philosophical neglect, in each case forcing SSK into a self-refuting 
position as we have seen. Thus SSK sees only that if extensionalism is 
right, then it is wrong, but sees it as inevitable, because it does not see 
that intensionality is presupposed anyway so that extensionalism is 
simply wrong: the initial premise is false and the argument collapses. 
Conversely, if we employ a transcendental approach as opposed to one 
                                                 
22 Note also that, because meanings do not themselves fully determine, they also do not 
have agency, just as SSK correctly claims in its criticism of its various opponents. 
Instead, agency is reserved to human meaning-users in whom meaning resides, but 
here agency amounts to changing and not creating meanings (Bloor 1997, 70). There 
must be meanings in the first place or there is no possibility of an agent having any 
understanding, which in turn rules out agency, including the agency to manipulate and 
create new meanings. 
 
TYFIELD / THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF FINITISM: FROM SSK TO ESK? 
VOLUME 1, ISSUE 1, AUTUMN 2008 81 
starting from the presumption of an extensionalist model of meaning, 
we can readily admit the intensionality of meaning and thus secure each 
of SSK’s critical points, while (in the schema above) the step to B or 
conclusion (3), via the false dilemmas and ambiguities of premise (2), 
and the insoluble paradoxes that come with that step are avoided. 
The refutation of premise (2) by transcendental reasoning, however, 
demands first that we admit the problems of finitism, for this alone can 
provide the motivation actually to examine the philosophical problems 
and not merely rest on an anti-philosophical complacency characteristic 
of naturalist perspectives. That is to say, so long as finitism is accepted 
one cannot even consent to the problems of reflexivity to be problems. 
For the ‘net of meaning’ picture makes it evidently absurd to attempt to 
step outside or beyond the net. Thus it is finitism, and the interactionist 
social ontology it sponsors, that licences the conflation of knowledge 
and social structure to the single un-tethered level of the net of 
meaning, and it is on this basis that problems of reflexivity are simply 
accepted as irresolvable. In the context of an underlying philosophical 
naturalism that precludes the analysis offered here and the admission 
of the importance of tackling philosophical problems, it follows that in 
order to begin even to address these problems, finitism must first be 
rejected. 
The fundamental false dilemma underlying SSK is, therefore, that 
between first or ex ante ‘rationalist’ philosophy and naturalist or 
sceptical anti-philosophy. Taking its stand against the former, SSK 
immediately sides with the latter, but thereby finds itself cast into the 
fogs of relativism, which it then fully embraces in its defiant dismissal 
of the problems of reflexivity. It is SSK’s (anti-) philosophical naturalism 
that explains the ex ante and unquestioned acceptance of 
extensionalism responsible for its intractable theoretical difficulties; 
thereby also explaining why SSK, despite its anti-philosophism, 
paradoxically finds itself dominated by its philosophical dimension, as 
noted by Hess above. But SSK need not take this option of philosophical 
naturalism because there exists the third option of a critical 
philosophical perspective, which asks [regarding rules/meaning]: given 
that [meaning use] is possible (at the price of ruling oneself into dumb 
silence), what is ontologically presupposed by this? With the clear 
alternative of a critical philosophy, then, we see that this element of 
SSK’s program can, and indeed must, be relinquished. 
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CONCLUSION 
We have investigated SSK and concluded that, as it stands, it does not 
afford a profitable basis for the development of an ESK, but rather 
forecloses such a project. Furthermore, we have found this to be caused 
by the inadequate philosophical understanding at its heart: its 
extensionalist theory of meaning, which manifests in the problems of 
reflexivity and meaning scepticism. Confronting this problem forces us 
to take an entirely different approach, examining the ontological 
presuppositions of this impossible but apparently ineluctable challenge. 
This thereby repudiates the fundamental philosophical problematic 
from which extensionalism itself arises, namely the attempt to provide a 
watertight philosophical ‘solution’ to the problems of meaning use that 
arise when it is treated in terms of logical determination of the 
application of labels of extensive sets. 
Such explicit transcendental philosophical examination, however, 
also significantly reorganizes the project of a social study of science, 
without thereby sacrificing its significant critical advantages over 
alternative research projects; which leave scientific knowledge sealed 
off, pristine, and inviolable for a wholly separate philosophy of science. 
Indeed, the exact opposite is the case: it is SSK itself that cannot sustain 
these critical points because, deprived of any possibility of knowing 
whether beliefs are true and even of any determinate meaning, it must 
rule itself into silence, taking even its own arguments with it. Time and 
again SSK points to important truths but on each occasion it then goes 
on to snatch them away, denying there are any truths at all. 
The implications of such a reorientation of SSK are of central 
importance for any project of an economics of scientific knowledge. 
This is not only in the sense of offering a model that is itself not riddled 
with problems, but also because an ESK, if it is to do anything at all, 
must be able to offer a critique of how and where the imposition of 
economic imperatives on scientific research has a detrimental effect on 
the “scientific knowledge” thereby produced. In the age of the 
ubiquitous penetration of such economic issues into research, the 
failure, or rather refusal, of any SSK-inspired ESK to make such 
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